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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION:
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THIS MATTER AS IT
WAS IMPROPERLY CERTIFIED UNDER RULE 54(b)
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Appellant UTCO Associates, Ltd. ("UTCO") appeals a
Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, entered on a jury
verdict in favor of Appellees Sumerset Houseboats Div. SMI
("Sumerset") and its President, James E. Sharpe ("Mr. Sharpe").
The Judgment was certified as final under Rule 54 (b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

In addition to the claims against

Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe which were decided by the jury, UTCO
brought claims against co-defendant K. Demarr Zimmerman ("Mr.
Zimmerman") arising from the same transaction.

At the time of

trial, Mr. Zimmerman had filed bankruptcy and UTCO had chosen not
to pursue those claims until after this matter was tried.

To

this day, the claims against Mr. Zimmerman remain pending in the
lower court.
The Judgment from which this appeal was taken was
certified by the trial court under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Such certification was improper, however, as

the factual overlap between UTCO's claims against Sumerset and
Mr. Sharpe raised in this appeal, and UTCOfs claims against Mr.
Zimmerman which remain pending before the trial court are based
on the same operative facts.

Thus, the Judgment at issue was not

eligible for certification under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

E.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,

1

814 P.2d 1099, 1104-1105 (Utah 1991);

Furniture Distrib. Ctr. v.

Miles, 821 P.2d 1165, 1166-1167 (Utah 1991) 1 .
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The following issues are presented for review in this
appeal:
1.

Did the trial court err in certifying as final the

Judgment dated September 4, 1996 which disposed of claims against
Appellants Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe, but not the claims against
Mr. Zimmerman which are based on the same transaction and
operative facts, and remain pending before the trial court?
The standard of review for a trial court's
certification under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is one of correctness, with no deference given to the
trial court.

E.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814

P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1991).
2.

Did the trial court err in declining to instruct

the jury on UTCO's equitable promissory estoppel claim despite
uncontroverted evidence establishing that:
a)

UTCO failed to exhaust its claim in bankruptcy
against Mr. Zimmerman?

1

Moreover, the trial court's Order Granting Plaintiff's
Rule 54(B) [sic] Motion to Certify Judgment Dated September 4,
1996 [R3210-3213] fails to properly set forth findings
"explain[ing] the lack of factual overlap between the certified
and remaining claims and thus satisfy the Kennecott criterion for
certification to be proper." Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d
137, 139 (Utah 1992).
2

b)

UTCO had a valid, enforceable contract with Mr.
Zimmerman for repayment of the funds sought from
Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe?

c)

UTCO had agreed to loan and had loaned the funds
to Mr. Zimmerman prior to the alleged promise by
Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe?

d)

UTCO admitted that the money transferred to
Sumerset was Mr. Zimmerman's money, not that of
UTCO?

The standard of appellate review for a trial court f s refusal to
give a proposed jury instruction is a question of law for which
no deference is given to the trial court.
Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1386 (Utah 1995);

E.g., Cornia v.
State v. Robertson, 923

P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997)(citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d
232, 238 (Utah 1992)).
3.

Did the trial court err in excluding evidence that

the serial number tentatively reserved for the Zimmerman
houseboat was, three months after the alleged fraud and after Mr.
Zimmerman had canceled the purchase, assigned to another boat
being manufactured for sale to an unrelated third-party?
The standard of appellate review for a trial court f s evidentiary
ruling is an abuse of discretion and the trial court's ruling is
given deference in light of its advantageous position. E.g., Nay
v. General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 1993)("abuse
of discretion and reverse only if the ruling is beyond the bounds
of reasonability");

Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 838

3

(Utah 1992) ("court's rulings regarding admissibility will not be
overturned 'unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in
error'");

State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993).
4.

If the trial court erred in issuing a ruling

precluding the introduction of evidence describing the houseboat
to which the serial number was eventually assigned more than
three months after the alleged fraudulent representation, was
UTCO prejudiced as it was allowed to introduce evidence: (1)
That, at the time of the alleged fraudulent statement, there was
no houseboat in existence with the serial number as set forth in
the invoice between Sumerset and Mr. Zimmerman;

(2)

That no

houseboat with that serial number was ever built to the
specifications in the invoice between Sumerset and Mr. Zimmerman;
and (3)

That a houseboat bearing the serial number initially

intended for the Zimmerman houseboat was sold to another party?
The standard of appellate review of a trial court' s evidentiary
rulings is whether there was error and whether such error was
"harmful".

Jouflas v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 927 P.2d

170, 173 (Utah 1996).

An error is "harmful" only where "the

likelihood of a different outcome in the absence of the error is
'sufficiently high as to undermine confidence in the verdict."
Id. at 174 (quoting State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah
1987));

see, also. State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67-70 (Utah

1993)(improper evidence ruling reversed only if showing of
prejudice (i.e., "reasonable likelihood that the error affected
outcome of the proceedings")).
4

III.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following cases are determinative of the issues

pertaining to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on
UTCO's promissory estoppel claims:

Knight v. Post,2 748 P. 2d

1097, 1099-1100 (Utah App. 1988)(pending bankruptcy claims
against third-party barred equitable claims because of failure to
exhaust all available legal remedies);

Commercial Fixtures and

Furnishing v. Adams,3 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1977) (existence of
valid contract with third-party to recover debt bars equitable
claim seeking to imply contract against another).
The following Utah Rules of Evidence are determinative
of the issues pertaining to the trial court's refusal to allow
evidence pertaining to the reassignment of the serial number:
Rule 402, Relevant evidence generally admissible;
irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States of the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.
•Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.

Attached as Addendum "A".
Attached as Addendum "B".
5

IV.
A,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION BELOW

UTCO brought this action against Sumerset, Mr. Sharpe
and Mr. Zimmerman asserting claims for breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, quantum meruit, contract implied in law, breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel,
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, conspiracy,
conversion, and implied in fact contract. [R561-577]4

All of

the UTCO f s claims arise from a single transaction whereby Mr.
Zimmerman purchased a houseboat from Sumerset.

Subsequent to the

filing of this action, Mr. Zimmerman filed a Chapter 7
bankruptcy.

[R108-109]5

On July 11, 1996, Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe filed a
Motion in Limine which sought the exclusion of evidence:
(1) that the serial number tentatively reserved for Mr.
Zimmerman f s houseboat was eventually assigned to another
houseboat more than three months after the alleged
misrepresentations and after Mr. Zimmerman canceled the order and
directed Sumerset to apply his $58,384 to Mr. Zimmermanfs then
existing debt owed to Sumerset, and (2) that the second houseboat

4

All citations are to the record as indexed by the Clerk
of the Third Judicial District Court pursuant to Rule 11(b) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
5

While UTCO filed a claim in Mr. Zimmerman1s bankruptcy,
it chose to not pursue those claims and instead chose to wait and
see how its claims against Mr. Sharpe and Sumerset were resolved.
6

was eventually sold to a third-party.

[1486-1490]

The grounds

for this Motion were that these subsequent events were irrelevant
to UTCO's claims and, moreover, under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, any probative value would be substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the
issues, and would unnecessarily lengthen the trial.
July 22, 1996, UTCO filed a Memorandum in Opposition.
1752]

[Id.]

On

[R1744-

On July 22, 1996, the Court granted the Motion and stated:
I'm going to grant the motion. I can't see any
relevance to the proposition that the, at least based
on what I've heard so far, that the reassignment of a
serial number to another boat, to a third person who is
not claiming to be involved in this situation, has any
relevance to the state of mind of the Defendant for
purposes of committing fraud at the time these
representations were made. I recognize after events
may have some probative value, but in this case I can't
see what it might be.
The fact that the boat with a serial number did
not exist, and was never built to the specifications in
the original invoice, is all the Plaintiff needs in
that regard. The rest of it is surplusage and a waste
of time. Unless the evidence changes, it's not coming
in. The Motion is granted.
That doesn't mean you can't put in evidence that
there was never a boat with that serial number, or that
was the serial number on the invoices and there is no
such boat, but it's not, I don't see any relevance to
the fact that serial number now appears on some other
boat. The Motion is granted.

[R1910]
UTCO's claims against Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe proceeded
to trial before the Third District Court, Honorable Timothy R.
Hanson presiding.

The matter was tried to a jury on July 22, 23,

25, 29 and 30, 1996.

During the course of the trial, UTCO

voluntarily dismissed its claims for conversion, quantum meruit,
7

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
foreclosure of security interest, and conspiracy.
The evidence at trial further established that UTCOfs
claims were still pending against Mr. Zimmerman in the bankruptcy
proceeding, [R2364] and that UTCO would receive a distribution
under the bankruptcy.

[R2447]

Additionally, UTCO had filed a

nondischargeability action in Mr. Zimmerman's bankruptcy which it
had not pursued to completion and which UTCO stopped pursuing
pending the outcome of the instant action.

[R2448-2449]

On July 25, 1996, after UTCO rested its case, Sumerset
and Mr. Sharpe filed Defendants1 Combined Motion for Directed
Verdict and Supporting Memorandum.

[R1572-1584]

Sumerset and

Mr. Sharpe's Motion for Directed Verdict sought judgment in their
favor on, inter alia, UTCO's promissory estoppel claim.
1575 Sc 1580-1582]

[R1573-

The Motion for Directed Verdict presented the

following bases for directing verdict against UTCO on its
equitable promissory estoppel claim:

(1) UTCO's promissory

estoppel claim is barred as UTCO failed to exhaust its legal
remedies because it had an express contract with Mr. Zimmerman
for repayment of the very funds sought against Sumerset and Mr.
Sharpe in its equitable claims, and claims under that contract
were pending in the bankruptcy court along with a complaint for
nondischargeability; [R1580-1582] and

(2) UTCO's promissory

estoppel claim is barred as there was no reasonable reliance as
UTCO had already loaned Mr. Zimmerman the $58,384 prior to any
alleged promise and UTCO admitted it had no ownership interest in
8

that money.

The issues raised by Defendants1

[R1573-1575, 1582]

Motion for Directed Verdict were extensively and fully argued by
all parties.

[R2390-2416] .

While the trial court initially indicated that it was
denying the Motion for Directed Verdict, [R2416] the trial court,
based in part on the position asserted in the Motion for Directed
Verdict, subsequently refused to instruct the jury on UTCO's
promissory estoppel claim and stated:
I've indicated in chambers that I was not
instructing on the equitable causes [sic] of action of
promissory [sic] estoppel. For the record, the reasons
I have determined not to do that is, I am satisfied the
Plaintiffs [sic] have an adequate remedy at law and, I
believe, it is the rule that equitable remedy is not
available as long as there is an adequate remedy at
law. And I believe there is here.
Also, I am satisfied that the concept promissory
estoppel basically mirrors the causes of action that
are being asserted in this case by the Plaintiff. And
they'll just be surplusage.
Finally, I'm satisfied that the Court of Appeals
case that was cited to me by Plaintiff's counsel,
saying that they seem to suggest that the Court must
send equitable causes of action to the jury, is
factually distinguishable in this case and I'm
satisfied that it would be inappropriate to submit that
equitable claim to a jury, if it was otherwise proper.
[R2606-2607]
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was instructed
on UTCO's claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, punitive
damages and breach of contract, and the jury found in favor of
Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe on all claims.

[R1670-1672]

Pursuant to

the jury's verdict, the trial court entered judgment of no cause
of action in favor of Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe.
9

[R1771-1773]

UTCO's claims against Mr. Zimmerman based on the same transaction
and the same operative facts remain pending before the trial
court.
On October 1, 1996 UTCO filed its first notice of
appeal of the trial court's Judgment.

[R1774-1779]

That appeal

was dismissed sua sponte by the Court as it was not a final
judgment as the claims against Mr. Zimmerman remained pending
before the trial court.

See Exhibit

!I

K" to Brief of Appellant.

On March 24, 2000, subsequent to the trial of UTCO's
claims against Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe, UTCO and Mr. Zimmerman
entered into a Stipulation for Nondischargeability of Debts in
the bankruptcy proceeding whereby Mr. Zimmerman acknowledged
owing UTCO $66,000 plus interest under the promissory note, the
same monies UTCO sought at trial (and continues to seek) from
Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe.

[R3149-3153]

On March 26, 1998 UTCO

obtained a Judgment in its favor against Mr. Zimmerman in the
amount of $81,209.26 (the $66,000 plus interest).

At that time,

UTCO stipulated and agreed to accept from Mr. Zimmerman the
amount of $7,000, less than ten-percent (10%) of the outstanding
Judgment, in full satisfaction of that Judgment.

[R3149-3153]

UTCO also maintained its rights to pursue its unsecured claim in
Mr. Zimmerman's Chapter 7 case.

[R3152]

UTCO then filed a motion to certify the Judgment as a
final judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which motion was opposed because of the factual
overlap between the claims on appeal and UTCO's claims against
10

Mr. Zimmerman which remained pending before the trial court.
UTCO's motion was granted by an Order dated March 22, 2000.
[R3210-3213]

In that Order, however, the trial court failed to

make findings explaining how the certified and remaining claims
were separate and did not factually overlap.

[Id.]

UTCO has not

dismissed its claims remaining in the trial court against Mr.
Zimmerman.
On April 19, 2000 UTCO filed its Notice of Appeal from
the September 4, 1996 Judgment and the trial court's order
certifying that judgment.
B.

[R3216-3225]

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

Sumerset is a Kentucky corporation engaged in the
business of manufacturing and selling houseboats, [R1958] and has
been in that business since 1953.

[R1972]

Mr. Sharpe was, at

all relevant times, the President of Sumerset.

[Id.1

In early 1991, Mr. Zimmerman was starting a business,
Lake Powell-N-Houseboats, whereby he would purchase houseboats
and then sell weekly shares in the boat to individuals, much like
a time-share arrangement.

[R1964-1965 & 1967-1968]

Mr.

Zimmerman visited Sumerset!s sales office in Atlanta, Georgia and
then visited Sumersetfs manufacturing plant in Somerset,
Kentucky.

[R1964-1965]

Over the next several months Mr.

Zimmerman purchased six (6) houseboats from Sumerset.

[R2126]

On approximately November 20, 1992 Mr. Zimmerman1s
company, Lake Powell-N-Houseboats, approached Sumerset regarding

11

the purchase of a 1993 model-year houseboat.6

[R2047]

In

connection with this proposed transaction, Sumerset created an
invoice describing the specifications and amenities of the
houseboat to be custom built and indicating the purchasers as
"Lake Powell-N-Houseboats/Demarr

[Zimmerman].11

[R2048]

It was

anticipated that manufacture of the boat would be completed in
March, 1993, [R2079]
$120,000.00.

and the purchase price would be

[R2051]

To finance this purchase, Mr. Zimmerman contacted UTCO,
a lending source he had previously used, seeking $75,000 to be
paid toward the purchase price.

[R2178-2179]

UTCO refused to

make a $75,000 loan to Mr. Zimmerman, but did agree to a loan in
the amount of $60,000.

[R2178-2179]

In connection with UTCO f s

loan to Mr. Zimmerman, as was the case with their prior loans,
Mr. Nelson, UTCO's counsel, prepared a promissory note, security
agreement, acknowledgement and UCC-1 Financing Statement, which
were executed by Mr. Zimmerman on December 21, 1992.
2181, 2195, 2292, 2582-2583]

[R2179-

Sumerset was not a party to these

agreements nor were these documents provided to Sumerset.
[R2540-2541]
Neither Sumerset nor Mr. Sharpe had any business
dealing directly with UTCO.

In fact, Mr. Sharpe testified that

he did not know UTCO was lending money to Mr. Zimmerman and, for

6

After this transaction Sumerset sold four houseboats to
Mr. Zimmerman and related entities. [R2126] These transactions
are not at issue in this litigation.
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all Mr. Sharpe knew, Mr. Nelson was Mr. Zimmerman's lawyer.
[R2538-2541]
After the loan was made, Mr. Nelson purports to have
had two conversations with Mr. Sharpe which serve as the sole
basis for, inter alia, UTCO's promissory estoppel claim.

With

respect to these conversations, Mr. Nelson testified at trial as
follows:
A. . . . I talked to [Mr. Sharpe] on the 19th, 20th,
21st. I don't have a calendar. I don't recall the day
I talked to him, the week before Christmas, where I
confirmed to him -- I think the 21st because that's
the day Zimmerman signed the loan document. I
confirmed to Mr. Sharpe that UTCO had made the loan,
that Demarr [Zimmerman] had signed the documents, and
that we were prepared to wire $60,000 to fund the loan.

[R2196;

Q.

What did he say to you?

A.

He said that is great, wire the money.

see also R2201, 2226, 2240] (emphases added).

Mr. Nelson further testified as follows:
Q.
And during that conversation you told Mr. Sharpe
that Mr. Zimmerman Had signed the loan documents?
A.

I believe that I did, yes.

Q.
All right. And going on in your deposition,
question, line 20, page 39. "Just so I understand the
timing of this conversation, did this occur before or
after UTCO had made the decision to actually loan funds
to Mr. Zimmerman?
"Answer:

It was after.

"Question: Did this conversation occur before or after
the conversation you had with Mr. Zimmerman in which
you informed him that UTCO would, in fact, loan him
$60,000.00?
The answer was after. Do you recall giving those
answers to those questions during your deposition?
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A.
I don ! t recall the specific questions or answers
but I have read them and the answers are correct.
Q.
And that is consistent with your testimony here at
trial, right?
A,

That's correct.

[R2241-2242] (emphases added) 7
On December 29, 1992, Sumerset received a wire transfer
in the amount of $58,384.

[R2129]

That wire transfer indicated

it was to be applied to "Demarr Zimmerman Account", without
mention of any particular boat.

[R2129-2130, 2272]

These funds

belonged to Mr. Zimmerman and, based on its own admissions, UTCO
had no interest in these funds wired to Sumerset.8

[R2552-2553]

Prior to completion of the Zimmerman houseboat, Mr.
Zimmerman informed Sumerset not to ship the houseboat as he would
not be able to pay for it.

[R2127]

Mr. Zimmerman instructed

Sumerset to apply the funds in the amount of $58,384 received by

7

Mr. Nelson was the only individual associated with UTCO
that had any discussions with Sumerset or Mr. Sharpe prior to the
initiation of this litigation. More particularly, Mr. Kent,
UTCO's sole general partner, expressly testified that he had no
contact, conversations or communications with Mr. Sharpe at any
time prior to this action. [R2363]
8

With respect to the request for admission, the trial
court stated to the jury as follows:
All right. The request is as follows. The Defendant,
Sumerset, sent to the Plaintiff the following request
and it reads as follows.
"Admit that you did not wire any funds to Sumerset
that belonged to Plaintiff." Plaintiff is, of course,
UTCO. The answer is, says, "See general objection."
You don't need to worry about that, "but admitted,"
that it was admitted.
[R2552-2553]
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Sumerset to another boat, and Sumerset complied.

[R2133, 2541-

2542]
After Mr. Zimmerman cancelled the order for the
houseboat, Sumerset "sidetracked" the Zimmerman boat by taking it
out of the production line and setting it aside until a purchaser
could be found so the boat could be completed to the buyer f s
specifications.

[R2542-2543]

More than three months later and

after the sale with Mr. Zimmerman had been canceled, the serial
number tentatively reserved for the Zimmerman houseboat was
assigned to another houseboat that was sold to an unrelated,
third-party.

[R1487, 1905, 2210-2211]

No serial numbers were altered or changed as the serial
number had not been affixed to the Zimmerman houseboat before Mr.
Zimmerman canceled the order.
V.
A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over This Appeal As The
Trial Court Improperly Certified The Judgment Under
Rule 54(b) Of The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure As The
Claims Against Mr. Zimmerman Based On The Same
Transaction And Same Facts Are Not Separate.
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the

trial court's certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

That certification was improper,

however, as UTCO's claims against Mr. Zimmerman which remain
pending before the trial court are based on the same transaction
and the same operative facts.

Moreover the trial court f s

certification improperly fails to set forth sufficient findings
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to show that the claims on appeal and the claims remaining before
the trial court do not factually overlap.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Refused To Instruct The
Jury On UTCO's Equitable Promissory Estoppel
Claim.

1)

UTCO Failed To Exhaust Its Claims Against
Zimmerman And UTCO Had An Adequate Remedy At Law.

The trial court correctly held UTCO had an adequate
remedy at law and declined to instruct the jury on UTCO's
equitable claim of promissory estoppel.

The only evidence at

trial was that UTCO loaned the $58,384 to Mr. Zimmerman under an
express contract to which neither Sumerset nor Mr. Sharpe were
parties.

The uncontroverted evidence also showed that UTCO had

filed claims against Mr. Zimmerman which were pending in the
bankruptcy court seeking to collect those very funds, and those
collection efforts were put on hold while UTCO pursued this
equitable claim against Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe.

Under this

Court's holding in Kniaht v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah
App. 1988) this attempted end-run around available legal remedies
cannot be allowed and the trial court properly dismissed the
equitable promissory estoppel claim.

See also Commercial

Fixtures and Furnishing v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah
1997)(existence of valid contract with third-party to recover
debt bars equitable claim seeking to imply contract against
another).
In addition, UTCO f s promissory estoppel claim was
barred as UTCO had an adequate remedy at law against Sumerset and
Mr. Sharpe.

Thus, the existence of the legal remedy, which
16

remedy was the same as the equitable remedy, barred the equitable
claim.
2)

UTCO Did Not Rely To Its Detriment On Any Alleged
Promise.

The trial court's refusal to instruct on the promissory
estoppel claim was also proper on the independent bases that the
evidence conclusively established that UTCO did not reasonably
rely on the alleged promise as:

(1)

UTCO had already agreed to

loan and had loaned the funds to Mr. Zimmerman before the promise
was purportedly made by Mr. Sharpe;

and (2)

The funds wired to

Sumerset belonged exclusively to Mr. Zimmerman and UTCO had no
ownership interest in them.
C.

The Trial Court Could Properly Preclude Admission
Of Evidence Regarding The Assignment Of The
Tentatively Reserved Serial Number To A Different
Boat Three Months After The Transaction And Mr.
Zimmerman's Cancellation Of The Houseboat
Purchase.

1)

UTCO Was Allowed To Introduce All Relevant
Evidence.

At trial, UTCO was allowed to introduce substantial
evidence regarding the subsequent reassignment of the serial
number to another houseboat after Mr. Zimmerman canceled his
order.

In fact, the very evidence UTCO, in framing the issues at

page 1 of its Brief, claims was improperly excluded was actually
admitted, namely the later sale of the boat to a third party
bearing the serial number tentatively assigned to the Zimmerman
houseboat. UTCO, as it did at trial, completely fails to
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articulate what evidence it claims was improperly excluded and
the relevance of that evidence.
2)

The Evidence Could Properly Be Excluded Under
Rules 4 02 And 4 03 Of The Utah Rules Of Evidence.

Contrary to UTCO's implication throughout its Brief,
there was no proffer or evidence of any alteration or changing of
any serial number.

The evidence excluded by the trial court was

simply Sumersetfs reassignment of the serial number tentatively
reserved for Mr. Zimmermanfs houseboat three months after any
alleged misrepresentation and Mr. Zimmerman's cancellation of the
purchase.

That evidence was properly excluded under Rule 402 of

the Utah Rules of Evidence as it had no relevance.

That Sumerset

reassigned the sequential serial number three months after the
transaction at issue had absolutely no relevance as demonstrated
by UTCO's repeated inability to articulate why or how the
evidence was relevant.
This evidence was also properly precluded under Rule
4 03 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, even if it were somehow deemed
relevant, as the evidence would have created unfair prejudice,
confusion and a waste of time.

Instead of focusing on the

pertinent issues, UTCO sought to interject this evidence to
attempt to raise the question that Sumerset somehow technically
violated some statute concerning the assignment of hull
identification numbers.

While there was no evidence to support a

violation by Sumerset, the jury would have been inundated with
vast amounts of evidence concerning the propriety of maintaining
serial numbers in a sequential order and focusing on things that
18

occurred three months after the transaction giving rise to UTCO's
claims.

Additionally, the jury would have been confused

regarding the effect of the evidence and, assuming a violation
occurred, may have rendered a verdict on that fact instead of
focusing on the relevant conduct which occurred at the time of
the transaction between the parties themselves.

Rule 403 is

designed precisely to prevent this type of distraction and
confusion during a trial and the trial court was clearly within
its discretion in precluding this evidence.
3)

Assuming The Exclusion Of Evidence Was Error, UTCO
Has Failed To Show That "The Likelihood Of A
Different Outcome In The Absence Of The Error Is
Sufficiently High So As To Undermine Confidence
In The Verdict.'"

A trial court's evidentiary rulings will be upheld on
appeal unless it is shown that had the incorrect ruling was
"harmful error".

To meet this showing, UTCO must establish that

had the error not occurred it was likely to result in a different
outcome and that the confidence in the jury!s verdict was
undermined.

UTCO has not and cannot make this showing.

It

appears that UTCO was allowed to introduce at trial all of the
evidence which is now claims it was entitled to introduce.
was allowed to introduce evidence:

UTCO

(1) That, at the time of the

alleged fraudulent statement, there was no houseboat in existence
with the serial number set forth in the invoice between Sumerset
and Mr. Zimmerman;

(2)

That no houseboat with that serial

number was ever built to the specifications in the invoice
between Sumerset and Mr. Zimmerman; and (3) That a houseboat
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bearing the serial number initially intended for the Zimmerman
houseboat was sold to another party.

Thus, even if the trial

court's exclusion of this evidence under Rules 402 and 403 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence was improper, it was not "harmful error".
To meet this burden, UTCO must establish that "the likelihood of
a different outcome in the absence of the error is 'sufficiently
high as to undermine confidence in the verdict."

Id. at 174

(quoting State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987));

see.

also. State v. Wetzel. 868 P.2d 64, 67-70 (Utah 1993) (improper
evidence ruling reversed only if showing of prejudice (i.e..
"reasonable likelihood that the error affected outcome of the
proceedings")).

Such is not the case and the Judgment must be

affirmed.
VI.
A.

ARGUMENT.

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THIS APPEAL AS
THE RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION WAS IMPROPER.

To be properly certifiable under Rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the claims must be separate from the
claims remaining before the trial court.

To satisfy this

criteria, the claims being certified and the claims remaining
must not have significant factual overlap.

E.g., Kennecott Corp.

v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1104-1105 (Utah 1991);
Furniture Distrib. Ctr. v. Miles, 821 P.2d 1165, 1166-1167 (Utah
1991).

Moreover, a lower court's certification must set forth

findings "explain[ing] the lack of factual overlap between the
certified and remaining claims and thus satisfy the Kennecott
criterion for certification to be proper.
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Bennion v. Pennzoil

Co., 826 P.2d 137, 139 (Utah 1992).

These requirements were not

met in this case.
This Court previously dismissed UTCOfs appeal of the
Judgment on the basis that it was not final because UTCO's claims
against Mr. Zimmerman remained pending before the trial court.
Thereafter, UTCO moved for and obtained an Order from the trial
court certifying the Judgment against Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe as
final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.9
UTCO's claims asserted against Mr. Zimmerman which remain pending
before the trial court are based on the same transaction and the
same facts as UTCO!s claims against Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe.

For

instance, the promissory estoppel claim which is the subject of
this appeal was pled jointly against Sumerset, Mr. Sharpe and Mr.
Zimmerman and the facts not only overlap, but are often
identical.

With respect to the reliance element, UTCOfs Second

Amended Complaint claims that its reliance of loaning and wiring
the funds "were induced by the defendants1 [i.e., Sumerset, Mr.
Sharpe and Mr. Zimmerman] promises".

[R000569]

That claim then

asks for the remedy of recovering $58,384 plus interest against
Zimmerman, Sharpe and Sumerset.10

Clearly there is substantial

factual overlap between the claims remaining before the trial
9

It should be noted that UTCO did not dismiss its claims
against Mr. Zimmerman, which would have made the Judgment final
as a matter of law. Instead, UTCO chose to move for a Rule 54(b)
certification and leave those claims against Mr. Zimmerman
pending before the trial court.
10

UTCO's other claims, including breach of contract,
misrepresentation, conspiracy, etc., also have substantial
factual overlap. [See R0561-0578]
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court and those at issue on this appeal such that certification
was improper.

E.g., Kennecott, 814 P.2d at 1103; Bennion, 826

P.2d at 138.
Finally, the trial court's certification is improper
because its findings fail to "explain the lack of factual overlap
between the certified and remaining claims" as required by the
Utah Supreme Court.
(Utah 1992).

Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137, 13 9

Thus, the certification was improper and this

appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY ON UTCO'S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM.
The trial court, at the conclusion of the evidence and
after receiving and hearing argument from all parties on
Sumersetfs and Mr. Sharpe's Motion for Directed Verdict on the
promissory estoppel claim, refused to instruct the jury on UTCO's
promissory estoppel claim.

A primary basis for declining to

instruct the jury on this claim (i.e., that UTCO had an adequate
remedy at law which barred its promissory estoppel claim) mirrors
a chief basis upon which the Motion for Directed Verdict on the
promissory estoppel claim was made by Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe.
While the trial court did not expressly reference the immediately
preceding Motion for Directed Verdict in its ruling, as UTCO
concedes on appeal that the trial court's failure to specify
whether it relied on Rule 12 or Rule 41, is not "significant".
UTCO's Brief at p. 9 The trial court was correct, as a matter of
law, in declining to instruct the jury on UTCO's promissory
estoppel claim and the judgment should be affirmed.
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A.

UTCO'S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM WAS BARRED AS
UTCO FAILED TO EXHAUST TITS CLAIMS AGAINST MR.
ZIMMERMAN.

It is generally held that one must first exhaust his
legal remedies before he may recover on the basis of an equitable
claim.

Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah App.

1988) ; Commercial Fixtures and Furnishing v. Adams, 564 P.2d
773, 774 (Utah 1977)(exhaustion of remedies required before
pursuit of any equitable claim);

see also UTCO's Brief at p. 12

("It is generally true that where there is an adequate remedy at
law, no equitable remedy will be implied").

As the evidence

shows, UTCO had an adequate remedy at law, namely the claim filed
in Mr. Zimmerman's pending bankruptcy.

As a matter of law,

UTCO's pending claim in Mr. Zimmerman's bankruptcy was a legal
remedy available to UTCO which barred them from pursuing the
equitable promissory estoppel claim against Sumerset and Mr.
Sharpe.

E.g., Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d at 1099-1100;

Commercial

Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774.
This Court's decision in Knight is dispositive of this
issue.

In Knight, the plaintiff brought an equitable claim

against defendant for work plaintiff performed for a third-party
which benefitted defendant.

The plaintiff also had filed a claim

in the third-party's pending bankruptcy.

This Court, reversing

the lower court's judgment against defendant and in plaintiff's
favor, held as follows:
As a general rule, one must first
exhaust legal remedies before he may recover
on the basis of the equitable doctrine of
quantum meruit. [citations omitted] The
2-3

legal remedies available to [plaintiff]
included. . . pursuit of the [third-partyfsi
assets as a creditor in the fthird-partyfsi
bankruptcy proceeding, neither of which
fplaintiffl successfully exhausted.
[Plaintiff] raised his claim in the
corporation's bankruptcy proceeding, but at
the time he initiated his lawsuit, he
modified his claim to recover from the
corporation only the amount that he did not
recover from [defendant]. He did not pursue
his claim in bankruptcy to its end to attempt
to recover from corporate assets, but brought
this action during the pendency of the
bankruptcy action. Neither did he submit
evidence to the lower court that pursuit of
the bankruptcy claim would, in all
likelihood, be fruitless. Thus, he did not
adequately pursue this remedy.
[Defendantl should not be held liable as
a consequence of [plaintiff's] failure to
successfully assert his legal rights.
Knight, 748 P.2d at 1099-1100 (emphases added).
That is the identical scenario present in this case.
The undisputed evidence establishes that UTCO filed claims
against Mr. Zimmerman in his bankruptcy to recover the same
$58,3 84 that is the subject of UTCO's promissory estoppel claim
against Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe.

[R2363-2364, 2445-2447]

UTCO's

claims were still pending against Mr. Zimmerman in the bankruptcy
proceeding, [R23 64] and UTCO presented no evidence its claims in
the bankruptcy would be fruitless.

In fact, the only evidence at

trial established that UTCO would receive a distribution under
the bankruptcy.

[R2447]

Additionally, UTCO had filed a

nondischargeability action in Mr. Zimmerman's bankruptcy which it
had not pursued to completion and which UTCO stopped pursuing
pending the outcome of the instant action.
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[R2448-244 9]

Thus,

UTCO had a legal remedy available which it had voluntarily failed
to exhaust and, as this Court held in Knight. Sumerset and Mr.
Sharpe "should not be held liable as a consequence of [UTCO's]
failure to assert its legal rights."

Knight, 748 P.2d at 1100;

see also Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774 (affirmed summary
judgment as

fl

[t]he action brought by plaintiff is one in equity

and brought without any attempt to exhaust any legal remedies
available.").

Accordingly, the trial court properly refused to

instruct the jury on the equitable promissory estoppel claim as
UTCO had failed to exhaust its legal remedies and, therefore,
could not recover under that claim as a matter of law.11
B.

UTCOfs Promissory Estoppel Claim Is Also Barred As
UTCO Had Adequate Legal Remedies Against Sumerset
And Mr. Sharpe.

In addition to the claims against Mr. Zimmerman, UTCO's
legal claims against Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe were "adequate" and
precluded UTCO from pursuing its equitable claim of promissory
estoppel.

As UTCO itself acknowledges, the test for determining

11

Subsequent to the trial of this matter, UTCO obtained a
Judgment against Mr. Zimmerman in the bankruptcy action for more
than $81,000.00, the entire outstanding obligation it sought (and
continues to seek) to recover from Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe.
Thereafter, UTCO agreed to accept less than ten-percent (10%) of
that amount in full satisfaction of that Judgment. This
subsequent evidence does not revive UTCO's claims as it remains
undisputed that at the time of trial UTCO had chosen not to
pursue its legal claims against Mr. Zimmerman thus barring its
equitable promissory estoppel claim. Knight, 748 P.2d at 10991100. Moreover, even if such evidence were properly considered,
it is just further evidence of UTCOfs failure to pursue to
exhaustion of its remedy against Mr. Zimmerman. Accepting only
pennies on the dollar in full satisfaction of Mr. Zimmermanfs
obligation is not exhaustion and Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe "should
not be held liable as a consequence of [UTCO's] failure to
successfully assert his legal rights." Id.
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whether a legal remedy is "adequate" for purposes of denying
equitable relief is whether "'the legal remedy, both in respect
to the final' relief and the mode of obtaining it, [is] as
efficient as the remedy which equity would afford under the same
circumstances.1"

UTCO's Brief at p. 12 (citing Council of and

for the Blind of Delaware County Valley, Inc. v. Regan, 709 F.2d
1521, 1550 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).

Despite the foregoing,

however, UTCO then argues that because it did not prevail on its
legal claims against Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe, they did not have
an adequate remedy at law.

Such is not the case:

Significantly, the adequacy of the legal remedy is not
measured by the success or failure of a legal claim.
Rather, in deciding whether a remedy is adequate, it is
the remedy itself, and not its possible lack of
success, that is the determining factor.
Charters Valley School Dist. v. Virginia Mansions
Apartments, Inc., 489 A.2d 1381, 1386-1387 (Penn.
1985).
This is not to say that a legal remedy must succeed to
be adequate. The law is plain that inadequacy means
only that "in its nature or character it is not fitted
or adapted to the end in view"; inadequacy does not
mean that the remedy is ineffectual.
Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1482 n. 16 (11th
Cir. 1993)(quoting Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U.S.
550, 554 (1885)).
The fact that UTC0 ! s legal claims were unsuccessful is of no
moment.

UTCO's legal remedies against Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe

provided the same remedy (i.e., money damages) and were adequate
as a matter of law.

Therefore, UTCO's equitable promissory

estoppel claim was barred as a matter of law and the trial
courtf s ruling should be affirmed.
2.6

C.

THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER BASES UPON WHICH THE TRIAL
COURT'S REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM WAS PROPER AS A MATTER
OF LAW.

Even if Utah law were ignored and the Court were to
assume that somehow UTCOfs failure to pursue its claims in Mr.
Zimmerman's bankiruptcy and the existence of UTCO's legal remedies
against Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe did not bar its promissory
estoppel claim in this action, there are several independent
legal bases upon which the trial court's refusal to instruct the
jury was proper and should be affirmed.12

They are addressed in

turn.
1.

UTCOfS PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM WAS BARRED AS
THERE WAS AN EXPRESS AGREEMENT BETWEEN UTCO AND
MR. ZIMMERMAN FOR REPAYMENT OF THE FUNDS AT ISSUE.

As a matter of law, the trial court also properly
refused to instruct on UTCOfs promissory estoppel claim as UTCO
had a valid contract with Mr. Zimmerman for repayment of the very
funds it sought to recover under its promissory estoppel claim.
Commercial Fixtures and Furnishing v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774
(Utah 1997).

This issue was also briefed in connection with the

Motion for Directed Verdict filed by Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe and

12

As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, the trial court is
vested with discretion to properly advise the jury, which
discretion also includes refusing to give instructions when they
would be inappropriate. Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc.,
567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977). The Utah Supreme Court has
stated: It is well recognized that the parties are entitled to
have their theories of the case presented to the jury in the form
of instructions, but only if they are supported by the evidence.
Id. (upholding trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on
several theories).
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was argued to the Court. On this issue, as with the failure to
exhaust legal remedies, Utah case law is determinative.
In Commercial Fixtures, plaintiff sued defendant for
unjust enrichment seeking to recover for improvements plaintiff
made to defendant's premises pursuant to a contract with
defendant's lessee. The lessee was not a party to the action.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rejection of
the equitable remedy by stating:
It is also noted that there was an express contract
between plaintiff and the lessee for the furnishing of
materials, and when an express agreement exists one may
not be implied.
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774.
UTCO, as did the plaintiff in Commercial Fixtures, asked the
trial court to imply an agreement between itself and Sumerset or
Mr. Sharpe, even though the evidence conclusively established
that UTCO had an agreement with Mr. Zimmerman whereby Mr.
Zimmerman was already obligated to repay the very funds UTCO was
seeking to recover.

Thus, the trial court's refusal to instruct

on UTCO's promissory estoppel claim should be affirmed on this
additional ground.
2.

UTCO'S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM WAS PROPERLY NOT
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY
ESTABLISHED UTCO DID NOT RELY ON THE ALLEGED
PROMISES.

As a matter of law, the trial court also properly
refused to instruct on UTCO's promissory estoppel claim as there
was no basis upon which a jury could find that UTCO reasonably
relied upon the promise alleged to have been made by Sumerset.
28

This issue was also briefed in connection with the Motion for
Directed Verdict filed by Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe and was argued
to the Court.
To prevail on its promissory estoppel claim, UTCO must
establish that, inter alia, it reasonably relied upon the
purported promise.
1, 4 (Utah 1992);

E.g., Weese v. Davis County Commfn, 834 P.2d
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90. The

evidence adduced at trial conclusively established that UTCO
failed to prove this element.
a.

No Reliance As UTCO's Decision To Loan And
The Loan Itself Was Made Before Alleged
Promise.

UTC0!s promissory estoppel claim was based on
Sumersetfs alleged misrepresentation

which, as described by Mr.

Nelson, UTCO's counsel and witness,13 occurred in the course of
phone calls he had with Mr. Sharpe.

Mr. Nelson testified on

direct examination that during the conversation during which the
alleged promise was made, Mr. Nelson confirmed to Mr. Sharpe that
UTCO had made the $60,000 loan and Mr. Zimmerman had signed the
documents.
On cross-examination,

Mr. Nelson then confirmed twice

that his own deposition testimony accurately reflected the timing
of the conversation he had with Mr. Sharpe:
Q.

Just so I understand the timing of this
conversation, did this conversation occur before

13

Mr. Nelson was the only witness presented at trial with
any personal knowledge of the alleged promise. UTCO had conceded
that no one other than Mr. Nelson had any communications with
anyone from Sumerset regarding this transaction.
29

or after UTCO had made the decision to actually
loan funds to Mr. Zimmerman?
A.

After.

Q.

Did this conversation occur before or after the
conversation you had with Mr. Zimmerman in which
you informed him that UTCO would in fact loan him
$60,000?

A.

After.

Thus, the undisputed evidence established that UTCOfs decision to
loan $60,000 to Mr. Zimmerman and the loan itself occurred before
the alleged promise. Accordingly, as a matter of law, there was
no evidence upon which the jury could have concluded that UTCO
relied (reasonably or otherwise) on the alleged promises
underlying the promissory estoppel claim.

E.g., Weese v. Davis

County Comm'n. 834 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1992)(promissory estoppel
requires showing of reasonable reliance).

UTCO had already

committed to make the loan, and had already made the loan when
the purported promise was made to Mr. Nelson.

Accordingly, as a

matter of law UTCO did not reasonably rely on the promise to its
detriment and the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on
UTCO's promissory estoppel claim must be affirmed.
b.

No Reliance To Its Detriment As UTCO Had No
Interest In The Funds Wired To Sumerset.

As a matter of law, the trial court also properly
refused to instruct on UTCOfs promissory estoppel claim as there
was no reliance by UTCO to its detriment as Mr. Zimmerman, not
UTCO, owned the funds wired to Sumerset.

The undisputed

evidence, including UTCO's own admission, established that UTCO
had no ownership interest in the funds that were wired to
3J0

Sumerset.

Moreover, as discussed above, UTCO agreed to make the

loan and made the loan before the alleged promise.

Accordingly,

there simply was no detriment suffered by UTCO as a result of any
alleged promise and the promissory estoppel claim failed as a
matter of law.
VIII.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY PRECLUDED EVIDENCE THAT THE
SERIAL NUMBER TENTATIVELY RESERVED FOR MR. ZIMMERMAN'S
HOUSEBOAT WAS REASSIGNED TO ANOTHER BOAT MORE THAN
THREE MONTHS AFTER THE ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATION AND
AFTER MR. ZIMMERMAN CANCELED THE SALE.
Prior to trial, Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe filed a Motion

in Limine seeking to exclude the introduction of the following
evidence:
(1)

That the serial number tentatively assigned to the
Zimmerman houseboat was reassigned more than three
months after the alleged misrepresentation, and
after Mr. Zimmerman canceled the sale and
instructed Sumerset to apply the funds to his
then-existing debt owed to Sumerset; and

(2)

That thereafter the second, different houseboat
was sold to a third-party.

The Motion in Limine sought exclusion of this evidence under
Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
UTCO, in response to the Motion just as in its Brief on
appeal, was unable to articulate how this evidence concerning
conduct occurring three months after the transaction at issue was
relevant in any manner.

Instead UTCO simply repeats the general

proposition that the court, in a fraud case, is to consider all
facts and circumstances.
question.

That explanation simply begs the

For instance, under UTCO's conclusory logic the trial

court would err in excluding evidence that Sumerset's production
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facility was painted a different color in March, 1993, While
equally irrelevant, it is a fact and circumstance that under
UTCO's logic would have to be presented to the jury,

UTCOfs

position notwithstanding, fraud allegations are subject to the
evidentiary requirements and limitations set forth in the Utah
Rules of Evidence as are all other claims.14 E.g., State v.
Winward, 909 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah App. 1995)(Evidence of
misconduct surrounding subsequent sale of property, sought to
show fraudulent intent, was properly precluded under the Utah
Rules of Evidence.).
UTCO's inability to articulate the relevance of
this evidence simply left the trial court without an explanation
as to how something which occurred more than three months after
the cancellation of the transaction at issue could have any
possible relevance.

After briefing and substantial argument to

the court, the trial court granted the Motion and explained:
Ifm going to grant the motion. I can't see any
relevance to the proposition that the, at least based
on what I've heard so far, that the reassignment of a
serial number to another boat, to a third person who is
not claiming to be involved in this situation, has any
relevance to the state of mind of the Defendant for
14

UTCO's true intention for introducing this evidence was
to create unfair prejudice and confusion. It is clear that UTCO
intended to use the evidence to attempt to create a question
regarding some perceived technical violation of the hull
identification statute and then have the jury base its decision
on this purported technical violation [R1519] instead of the
actual issue in this case -- namely, Sumerset's and Mr. Sharpe's
conduct toward UTCO which the jury ruled upon and found did not
support UTCO's claims. While Sumerset disputes any violation of
any law, it would be irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial and simply
confuse the jury even if it were deemed to have occurred. Thus,
the evidence was properly precluded.
3-2

purposes of committing fraud at the time these
representations were made. I recognize after events
may have some probative value, but in this case I canft
see what it might be.
The fact that the boat with a serial number did
not exist, and was never built to the specifications in
the original invoice, is all the Plaintiff needs in
that regard. The rest of it is surplusage and a waste
of time. Unless the evidence changes, it's not coming
in. The Motion is granted.
That doesn't mean you can f t put in evidence that
there was never a boat with that serial number, or that
was the serial number on the invoices and there is no
such boat, but it's not, I don't see any relevance to
the fact that serial number now appears on some other
boat. The Motion is granted.
[R1910]
In reviewing the trial court's evidentiary ruling,
deference is given to the trial court's advantageous position in
making this ruling and its decision will be affirmed unless "it
clearly appears that the lower court was in error."
v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 838 (Utah 1992);

E.g., Heslop

cf. Nay v.

General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 1993)("reverse
only if the ruling is beyond the bounds of rationality").
A.

UTCO WAS ALLOWED TO INTRODUCE ALL EVIDENCE
REGARDING THE SUBSEQUENT REASSIGNMENT OF THE
SERIAL NUMBER TO ANOTHER HOUSEBOAT.

In its Brief to this Court, UTCO raises the issue of
whether the trial court erred by excluding evidence of
"defendants1 assignment of the serial number sent to UTCO to a
different boat and the sale of that second boat to a third
party."

UTCO's Brief at p. 1.

At trial, UTCO was allowed to
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introduce all evidence that had any potential relevance to its
claims.

UTCO introduced the following evidence:
1)

The houseboat at issue was never constructed;
[E.g., R1910, 1928, 2097-2098]

2)

The houseboat at issue did not exist on the date
Sumerset received Mr. Zimmerman's $58,384; [Id.]

3)

There was no houseboat constructed matching the
MSO and invoice created for Mr. Zimmermanfs
houseboat; [Id.]

4)

The houseboat at issue never existed;
1929, 2097-2098]

5)

The houseboat described in the November, 1992
invoice with the serial number in that invoice was
never manufactured by Sumerset; [R1910, 2097-2098]

6)

The houseboat with the serial number on the
Zimmerman invoice and MSO was sold to someone
else. [R2210]15

[R1910,

All evidence potentially relevant to the issues in this case was
presented to the jury.

UTCO does not describe in its Brief (nor

did it describe by proffer at trial) what additional evidence it
believes was improperly excluded from the trial court.

And as

discussed below, the exclusion of any further evidence on this
issue, assuming UTCO had some that it was not allowed to present,
was proper under the Utah Rules of Evidence.

15

This evidence appears to be the very evidence UTCO is
now claiming it was error for the trial court to exclude. As
admitted by UTCO in its Brief at p. 19, however, UTCO was
permitted at trial to introduce evidence "that a boat bearing the
serial number sent to Nelson [UTCOfs lawyer] was sold to someone
else."
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B.

THE EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED UNDER RULE 402
OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE AS IT WAS PATENTLY
IRRELEVANT.

Rule 4 02 of the Utah Rules of Evidence expressly
provides that "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not
admissible."

The trial court clearly acted within its discretion

when it precluded the introduction of this evidence on the
grounds it was irrelevant.
UTCO brought this action asserting claims for breach of
contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and other
miscellaneous claims arising out of the canceled sale of a
houseboat by Sumerset to Mr. Zimmerman.

UTCO's claim is centered

on a $60,000 loan it made to Mr. Zimmerman, a portion of which
was forwarded to Sumerset in December, 1992 to be applied to
"Demarr Zimmerman Account."

A few months later, Mr. Zimmerman

canceled the purchase and directed Sumerset to apply the $58,384
to Mr. Zimmerman's then-existing debt owed to Sumerset.

Sumerset

then "sidetracked" the production of the houseboat Mr. Zimmerman
had ordered.
After Mr. Zimmerman canceled the purchase and the
houseboat at issue was sidetracked, and more than three months
after any alleged misrepresentation, Sumerset assigned the serial
number initially reserved for Mr. Zimmerman's houseboat to
another entirely different boat eventually sold to a third-party.
The assignment of the serial number to a different houseboat and
the sale of that boat to a third-party all occurred more than
three months after the transaction at issue in UTCO's claims and
35

that evidence is irrelevant to any of UTCO's claims. Therefore,
the evidence was properly precluded under Rule 402 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.
C.

THE EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED UNDER RULE 403
OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE AS ITS INTRODUCTION
WOULD HAVE CREATED CONFUSION OF THE ISSUES AND
UNFAIR PREJUDICE, AND WOULD HAVE BEEN A WASTE OF
TIME.

Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 4 03.
As under Rule 402, it was within the trial courtfs discretion to
preclude this evidence under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
Even assuming there was some probative value to the
subsequent assignment of the serial number to another houseboat
months later, that probative value would have been substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the
issues, and would have unnecessarily lengthened the trial by
several days.

UTCO's apparent motivation in seeking to introduce

evidence of the subsequent reassignment of the serial number and
sale was to prejudice Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe and introduce
confusion into the issues. UTCO intended to use this evidence to
attempt to create some question that Sumerset subsequently
violated the law regarding assignment and affixing of hull
identification numbers to the Zimmerman houseboat or the second,
3£

different houseboat.

[R1519]

Such a use of this irrelevant

evidence would directly violate Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, particularly where there is no evidence of any
alteration or changing of a serial number but merely a
reassignment on paper of a serial number to avoid a gap in serial
numbers.

While Sumerset (which has been in the houseboat

business for nearly 45 years) did not violate any laws in this
transaction, even assuming that more than three months after the
transaction at issue Sumerset somehow technically violated a
statute regarding the assigning of hull identification numbers,
the evidence would have been irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial,
and result in nothing but confusion.

The relevant issues for the

jury to determine were whether the acts of Sumerset and Mr.
Sharpe were fraudulent as to UTCO, not whether Sumerset later
broke the law or defrauded some third-party.

E.g., State v.

Winward, 909 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah App. 1995).
If UTCO had been allowed to introduce evidence of the
reassigning of the serial number months later, Sumerset and Mr.
Sharpe would have been forced to counter that evidence
demonstrating why their subsequent actions were proper.

This

would have entailed several witnesses, substantial costs and
expenses, and would have consumed a number of trial days.
Additionally, it would have been unlikely that the jury would
have perceived that its verdict should not turn on whether the
subsequent reassignment of the serial number was proper,
especially after the bulk of the trial would have been focused on
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this issue which is tangentially related, at best.

It is

precisely this type of confusing and prejudicial sidetrack that
Rule 403 was designed to prevent.

See McCormick, Evidence § 185;

State v. Winward, 909 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah App. 1995) (evidence
sought to prove fraudulent intent properly precluded under Rule
403 where the proffered evidence posed risk of diverting jury f s
attention from pertinent issue and would prejudice defemdant);
West v. Carson, 49 F.3d 433, 434-35 (8th Cir. 1995).
Thus, based on the foregoing the trial court"s ruling
excluding the evidence of the subsequent reassignment of the
serial number to a second, different houseboat that was
eventually sold was within the trial court f s discretion and was
proper under the Utah Rules of Evidence.
D.

UTCO HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT EVEN IF THERE WAS AN
IMPROPER EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE THAT THE ADMISSION
OF THAT EVIDENCE WAS LIKELY TO RESULT IN A
DIFFERENT OUTCOME.

Finally, even assuming there was some evidence that was
improperly excluded from the trial of this matter, UTCO has
failed to show that the incorrect ruling was "harmful error".
meet this burden, UTCO must establish that "the likelihood of a
different outcome in the absence of the error is 'sufficiently
high as to undermine confidence in the verdict. 1 "

Id. at 174

(quoting State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987));

see,

also, State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67-70 (Utah 1993)(improper
evidence ruling reversed only if showing of prejudice (i.e.,
"reasonable likelihood that the error affected outcome of the
proceedings")).

UTCO has not and cannot make this showing.
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To

It appears that UTCO was allowed to introduce at trial
all of the evidence which it now claims it was entitled to
introduce.
evidence:

It is undisputed that UTCO was allowed to introduce
(1)

That, at the time of the alleged fraudulent

statement, there was no houseboat in existence with the serial
number as set forth in the invoice between Sumerset and Mr.
Zimmerman;

(2)

That no houseboat with that serial number was

ever built to the specifications in the invoice between Sumerset
and Mr. Zimmerman; and (3)

That a houseboat bearing the serial

number initially intended for the Zimmerman houseboat was sold to
another party.

The jury heard all of this evidence and

unanimously ruled that neither Sumerset nor Mr. Sharpe had
committed fraud or negligent misrepresentation.
UTCO's Brief is devoid of any attempt to show how the
omission of any evidence of the subsequent reassignment of the
serial number, which occurred three months after the alleged
fraud, would have changed the outcome.

Moreover, given the

evidence that UTCO was allowed to and did present on this issue,
there simply was no harmful error.

Thus, even if the trial

court's exclusion of this evidence under Rules 402 and 403 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence was improper, it was not "harmful error".
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The trial court properly declined to instruct the jury
on UTCOfs equitable promissory estoppel claim as UTCO failed to
exhaust its legal remedies, had adequate legal remedies
available, had a valid contract with Mr. Zimmerman for repayment
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of the funds, and, moreover, failed to rely to its detriment on
the alleged promise.

The trial court also acted within its

discretion in precluding UTCO from introducing evidence of the
subsequent reassignment of the serial number tentatively reserved
for Mr. Zimmermanfs houseboat to another boat three months after
the transaction at issue and after Mr. Zimmerman canceled the
purchase.

That ruling was proper under Rules 402 and 403 of the

Utah Rules of Evidence.

Accordingly, the Judgment rendered in

favor of Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe by the jury should be affirmed
and this appeal dismissed.
DATED this 7th day of December, 2000.
ATKIN 8c LILJA, P.C.

JoHcTbfesui L. Hawkins
/1
Attorneys for Appellees
\J
Sumerset and Mr. Sharpe
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748 P.2d 1097, Knight v. Post, (Utah App. 1988)
*1097 748 P.2d 1097
Stan KNIGHT, dba Stanco Insulation Services,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
George P. POST, dba Post Petroleum Company
Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 860120-CA
Court of Appeals ot Utah
Jan. 22, 1988.
Company contracted with corporate operator ot oil
well to improve oil well site. When corporate
operator did not pay and tiled bankruptcy, compan\
brought action against proprietorship which owned
working interest in oil well to recover tor services
performed m improving oil well. The Seventh
District Court, Uintah County, Richard C. Davidson,
J., tound in favor of company on basis of quantum
meruit, and proprietorship appealed The Court ot
Appeals, Garff, J., held that restitution based on
quantum meruit was improper where company tailed
to first exhaust legal remedies, companv did not show
that proprietorship had been unjustly enriched, and
company had no contractual relatioaship, eitner
express or implied, with proprietorship.
Reversed.
1 APPEAL AND ERROR <§=*845(2)
30
—
30XVI Review
30XVI(A)
Scope, Standards, and Exten:. .r.
General
30k844
Review Dependent on Mode or Trial
in Lower Court
30k845
In General
30k845(2)
Cases suomined below on agreed
case or statement.
Utah App. 1988.
Where parties have stipulated facts for purposes of
appeal, reviewing court does not apply clearly
erroneous standard but will sustain court's decision
only if convinced of its correctness.
2. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS
<S=>30
205H —
205HI Nature and Grounds or Obligation
205HI(C) Services Rendered
205Hk30
Work and labor m general, quantum
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meruit.
Utah App. 1988.
One must first exhaust legal remedies before he may
r
ecover on basis of equitable doctrine ot quantum
meruit.
3. MINES AND MINERALS <®=^ 109
260 —
260III Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells
260111(C)
Rights and Liabilities Incident tc
Working
260kl09
Contracts for testing or working.
Utah App. 1988.
Company which made improvements on oil well site
pursuant to contract between company and corporate
operator of well and which did not receive payment
ror work could not seek recovery on basis of quantum
meruit since company did not first exhaust legal
remedies where company failed to bring action
eniorcmg mechanics' lien within statutory period,
company did not pursue claim in bankruptcy to its end
when corporate operator filed for bankruptcy, and
company did not submit evidence to lower court that
pursuit of bankruptcy claim would be fruitless.
4. BANKRUPTCY <S=>2397(1)
51
—
51IV
Effect of Bankruptcy Relief; Injunction
and Stay
5IIV(B) Automatic Stay
51k2394
Proceedings, Acts, or Persons
Affected
51k2397
Mortgages or Liens
51k2397(l)
In general
[See headnote text below]
4. MECHANICS' LIENS <S^260(4)
257 —
257X1 Enforcement
257k260 Time to Sue, Limitations, and Laches
257k260(4) Commencement of suit.
Utah App. 1988.
Corporation's bankruptcy action does not necessarily
preclude recovery under properly filed mechanics'
hen nor does it toll requirement of bringing action to
enforce such lien within statutory 12-month period.
U.C.A.1953, 38-1-5, 38-1-11.
5. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS
<®=*30
205H —
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation
205HI(C) Services Rendered
205Hk30
Work and labor in general, quantum
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meruit.
Utah App. 1988.
Two branches of quantum meruit are contracts
implied in law, also known as quasi-contracts or
unjust enrichment, which are not actions to enforce
contract but are actually actions to require restitution,
and contracts implied in fact, which are contracts
established by conduct.
6. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS
<®^2.1
205H —
205HI Nature and Grounds ot Obligation
205HI(A) In General
205Hk2
Constructive or Quasi Contracts
205Hk2.1
In general.
Formerly 205Hk2
[See headnote text below]
6. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS
205H —
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obi.gation
205HI(A) In General
205Hk2
Constructive or Quasi Contracts
205Hk3
Unjust enrichment.
Utah App. 1988.
To prevail under theory of contract implied in law or
unjust enrichment, plaintiff must show that plaintitt
conferred benefit upon defendant, defendant uas
aware of benefit, and defendant retained benefit under
such circumstances as to make it inequitable tor him
to retain benefit without payment of its \ alue
7 MINES AND MINERALS <§==> 109
260 —
260III Operation of Mines, Quames, and Wells
260111(C)
Rights and Liabilities Incident to
Working
260kl09
Contracts for testing or working.
Utah App. 1988.
Although
company
conferred
benefit
ot
improvement of oil well site upon proprietorship
which owned working interest m oil well, company
did not show that proprietorship retained benefit under
circumstances that would make it inequitable for it to
retain benefit without payment of its value where
company introduced no evidence to indicate that
propnetorship requested services of company or
deliberately misled it.
8. MINES AND MINERALS <®=>109
260 —
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260III Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells
260111(C)
Rights and Liabilities Incident to
Working
260kl09
Contracts for testing or working
Utah App. 1988.
Company failed to show that there was either
express or implied contract between it and
proprietorship owning working interest in oil well on
which company made improvements for which it was
never paid where company did not know ot
proprietorship's existence at time it entered into
contract with corporate operator of well and so could
not have had any direct dealings including express
contract with proprietorship.
9. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS
205H —
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation
205HI(C) Services Rendered
205Hk33
Rendition and Acceptance of Services
in General
205Hk35
Effect of request or promise to pay.
Utah App. 1988.
Required elements of recovery on theory ot contract
implied in fact are that defendant lequested plaintitf to
perform work, plaintiff expected defendant to
compensate him, and defendant knew or should have
known that plaintiff expected compensation
10 MINES AND MINERALS @=*109
260 —
260DI Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells
260HI(C)
Rights and Liabilities Incident to
Working
260kl09
Contracts for testing or working.
Utah App. 1988.
Company did not have implied-in-fact contract with
proprietorship which owned working interest in oil
well on which company had made improvements
pursuant to contract with corporate operator of well
where company did not know of or deal with
propnetorship prior to bankruptcy proceedings ot
corporate operator of well, proprietorship did not
request company to perform work or expect to pay
him because propnetorship did not deal with
company, and company could not have expected
propnetorship to pay it because it did *1097 not
know of propnetorship's existence.
*1098 F. Alan Fletcher (argued), Pruitt, Gushee &
Fletcher, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
John R. Anderson (argued), Vernal, for plamtifi and
respondent.
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Before BILLINGS, GARFF and JACKSON. JJ.

in bankruptcy. On January 10, 1983, Knight filed a
creditor's claim against the corporation in tne
bankruptcy proceedings, seeking payment of the entire
amount due. Subsequently, Knight learned mat tne
corporation had no interest in the well location, but
was merely the operator of the well, and that George
Post had an ownership interest in the well.

OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
The trial court found defendant/appellant, George P.
Post, a part owner of an oil well, liable tor labor and
materials provided by plaintitt/respondent, Stan
Knight, to improve the oil well site pursuant to a
contract between Knight and the corporate operator of
the well. Post seeks reversal ot the ludgment.
The parties agreed to the following statement of the
record on appeal: Knight conducted an insulation
business known as Stanco Insulation Services. Post,
doing business under a proprietorship named Post
Petroleum Company, owned a 33.75% working
interest in an oil well located in Uintah County. Utah.
Post Petroleum Company, Inc. (the corporation), was
the corporate operator of the oil well.
The
corporation is not a party to this action and is a
separate entity from Post's proprietorship.
In March 1982, Knight orally contracted with the
corporation to turrush labor 2nd materials tor
insulting an oil tank battery 2nd erecting iwo
buildings at the well site. At this *ime, he uas
unaware of the existence of the proprietorship, Post
Petroleum Company, and did not know who owned
the well. He satisfactorily completed the contracted
work between March 18, 1982 and April 26, 1982,
and then, according to instructions given by the
corporation's president. *1099
Larry McLane.
submitted his invoice for S18.437.13 to tne
corporation. There was no dispute that this was a
reasonable price for the work. Knight did not deal
with George Post personally during the course ot this
work, nor was he aware of any relationship between
the corporation and Post Petroleum Company.
The corporation never paid Knight, and, in the
course of his several inquiries about the unpaid bill
with McLane, Knight was never advised that he
should bill any other party. However, both Post and
the corporation knew that Knight was billing the
corporation and not the proprietorship.
On July 14, 1982, Knight, unaware that the
corporation had no possessory interest m the oil well,
attempted to record a mechanics' lien on the oil well
property, but placed an incorrect property description
on his lien

In March 1983, Post Petroleum Company, Post's
proprietorship, which had taken over operation ct the
well, contracted with Knight to do additional work on
the well tor which it paid him S395.60. Knight then
sought payment from Post on his 518,437.13 claim,
but was refused. Knight initiated this lawsuit, seeking
to recover the $18,437.13 claim, 18% interest, and
S2.500 in attorney tees from Post. He then amended
nis still-pending bankruptcy claim, seeking only those
sums which he did not recover from Post.
The trial cpurt found in favor of Knight on the basis
of quantum meruit, reasoning that the relationship
between George Post and the corporation had unjustly
confused Knight as to the proper party from whom to
seek payment, and that Post was the ultimate
beneficiary ot the contract between Knight and the
corporation. However, the coui reduced the amount
due Knight under the contract by the 66 25 ~,c ot ihe
well owned by non-parties re the lawsuit.
On appeal, Post argues that the trial court erred in
awarding judgment against him on the basis of
juantum meruit
We agree, reverse the trial court,
and find that restitution based on quantum meruit was
improper because: (1) Knight failed to first exhaust
his legal remedies; (2) Knight did not introduce
sufficient evidence to show that Post had been unjustly
enriched;
and (3) there was nc contractual
relationship, either express or implied, oerueen
Knight and Post.
[1] The Utah Supreme Court, in Sacramento
Baseball Club, Inc. v. The Great Northern Baseball
Co., 748 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987)(citation
omitted), stated that M[w]hen a trial court relies on
stipulated facts to decide a case, this Court does not
apply the clearly erroneous standard, but will sustain
the lower court's decision only if convinced of its
correctness. Thus, we examine the facts de novo."
Although, m the present case, the parties have
stipulated facts for the purposes of appeal, we see no
distinction, and the standard of review remains the
same. Christensen v. Abbott, 671 P.2d 121, 123
(Utah 1983). Thus, we review both factual and legal
issues

Several months later, the corporation filed a petition
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I
Failure to Exhaust Legal Remedies
P][3][4] As a general rule, one must first exhaust
his legal remedies before he may recover on the basis
of the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit. See
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d
1382, 1388 (Utah 1982); Commercial Fixtures and
Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah
1977).
The legal remedies available to Knight
included a mechanics' lien on the well property and
pursuit of the corporation's assets as a creditor in the
corporation's bankruptcy proceeding, neither of which
Knight successfully exhausted.
*1100 Knight failed to perfect his mechanics' lien
against Post because he incorrectly described the
atfected property, thus not complying with Utah Code
Arm. Sec. 38-1-7 (1981). See Westinghouse Hec.
Supply Co. v. W. Seed Prod. Corp., 119 Ariz. 377,
580 P.2d 1231, 1233 (App.1978); Buehner Block Co.
v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517, 520-21
(19S7).
Further, Knight failed to bring an action enforcing
the lien within the statutory period. Under Utah Code
Ann.. Sec. 38-1-11 (1974), (FN1) an action to enforce
a mechanics' lien must be commenced within twelve
months from the completion of the work. An
untimely action under this section is jurisdictional and
forecloses the parties' rights. (FN2) AAA Fencing
Co. v. Raintree Dev. and Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289,
290^91 (Utah 1986); Morrison v. Carey-Lombard
Co., 9 Utah 70, 33 P. 238, 239 (1893). Therefore,
Knight did not exhaust this remedy, and, at this point
in time, may not because his rights and remedies
under the mechanics' lien statutes are extinguished.
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774.
Knight raised his claim in the corporation's
bankruptcy proceeding, but at the time he initiated this
lawsuit, he modified his claim to recover from the
corporation only the amount that he did not recover
from Post. He did not pursue his claim in bankruptcy
to its end to attempt to recover from corporate assets,
but brought this action during the pendency of the
bankruptcy action. Neither did he submit evidence to
the lower court that pursuit of the bankruptcy claim
would, in all likelihood, be fruitless. Thus, he did not
adequately pursue this remedy.
Post should not be held liable as a consequence of
Knight's failure to successfully assert his legal rights.
See Utschig v. McClone, 16 Wis.2d 506, 114

Page 4
N.W.2d 854 (1962). As in Commercial Fixtures,
Knight has failed to exhaust his legal remedies, so
may not recover on the basis of quantum meruit.
II
Quantum Meruit
Because the trial court based its ruling upon
quantum meruit, we address that question even though
our ruling on failure to exhaust legal remedies is
dispositive of the case.
[5] In Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah
Ct.App.1987), this Court has identified two branches
of quantum meruit: (1) contracts implied in law, also
known as quasi-contracts or unjust enrichment, which
are not actions to enforce a contract but are actually
actions to require restitution;
and (2) contracts
implied in fact, which are contracts established by
conduct. Knight cannot prevail under either of these
branches.
[6] First, to prevail under the first branch of
quantum meruit, contracts implied in law or unjust
Enrichment, Knight must show the following three
dements: (1) Knight conferred a benefit upon Post;
(2) Post was aware of the benefit; and (3) Post
retained the benefit under such circumstances as to
make it inequitable for him to retain the benefit
without payment of its value. Berrett v. Stevens, 690
t\2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984); Davies, 746 P.2d at 269.
[7] It is undisputed that Knight conferred a benefit
Upon Post and that Post knew about and was using the
benefit. However, Knight did not show that Post
*1101. retained the benefit under circumstances that
Would make it inequitable for him to retain it without
payment of its value. In Commercial Fixtures, the
Utah
Supreme
Court
defined
inequitable
circumstances as:
[t]he mere fact that a third person benefits from a
contract between two others does not make such
third person liable in quasi-contract, unjust
enrichment, or restitution. There must be some
misleading act, request for services, or the like, to
support such an action.
Mere failure of
performance by one of the contracting parties does
not give rise to a right of restitution.
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
Knight relies upon the reasoning in Paschall's, Inc.
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748 P.2d 1097, Knight v. Post, (Utah App. 1988)
v. Dozier, 219 Term. 45, 407 S.W.2d 150 (1966),
which states that recovery on a quantum meruit action
may be had in some instances in which a materialman
or subcontractor furnishes labor or materials which
benefit the property of a person with whom there is
not privity of contract. However, this is at variance
with Commercial Fixtures.
Knight introduced no evidence to indicate that Post
requested services of Knight or deliberately misled
him. In fact, the parties stipulated that Knight did not
even know of Post's existence until after the
corporation had filed for bankruptcy. The only
evidence introduced even suggesting a misleading act
is the similarity in names between the corporation and
the proprietorship. While we recognize the possibility
that Post created a corporation and a proprietorship
with the same name to deliberately defraud creditors,
if and when the corporation went bankrupt, Knight
has not introduced any such evidence. Therefore, he
has not shown that it would be inequitable for Post to
retain the benefit without payment of its value.
[8] Second, Knight has failed to show that there is
either an express or implied contract between himself
and Post, on which he may base recovery. See
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774.
The stipulated facts indicate that Knight did not
know of Post's existence at the time he entered into
the contract, so could not have had any direct
dealings, including an express contract, with Post.
[9][10] Also, Knight did not prove the required
elements of the second branch of quantum meruit.
contracts implied in fact, to show the existence of an
implied contract with Post. To prevail under this
theory. Knight was required to show that: (1) Post
requested Knight to perform the work; (2) Knight
expected Post to compensate him; and (3) Post knew
or should have known that Knight expected
compensation. Davies, 746 P.2d at 269.
The facts indicate that Knight did not know of or

deal with Post prior to the bankruptcy proceedings, so
Post did not request Knight to perform the work or
expect to pay him because he did not deal with
Knight, and Knight could not have expected Post to
pay him because he did not know of Post's existence.
On the contrary, Knight had an express contract
with the corporation, and dealt exclusively with it in
contracting to do the work, attempting to collect his
bill, and filing his mechanics' lien. Thus, Knight did
not have an implied contract with Post.
See
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774.
Since there was no express or implied contract with
Post, Knight cannot recover.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed. Costs
awarded to Post.
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
FN1. This statute reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for must
be begun within twelve months after the completion
of the original contract.... Within the twelve months
herein mentioned the lien claimant shall file for
record with the county recorder of each county in
which the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency
of the action, in the manner provided in actions
affecting the title or right to possession of real
property, or the lien shall be void, except as to
persons who have been made parties to the action
and persons having actual knowledge of the
commencement of the action.
FN2. We note that the corporation's bankruptcy
action did not necessarily preclude recovery under a
properly filed mechanics' lien nor did it toll the
requirement of bringing an action to enforce such a
lien within the statutory twelve month period. See
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 38-1-5 (1974); Munson v.
Risinger, 114 So.2d 59, 61 (La.Ct.App. 1959).
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564 P.2d 773, Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, (Utah 1977)
•773 564P.2d773
COMMERCIAL FIXTURES AND
FURNISHINGS, INC, a Utah
Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Eldon ADAMS, an Individual, and New Life
Health Spa, by and
through Eldon Adams, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 14700.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 13, 1977.
A supplier of materials incorporated into leased
property at the request of the tenant brought an action
against the landlord after default under the lease had
occurred, seeking recovery for the value ot the
materials under a theory ot unjust enrichment. The
Fourth District Court, Utah County. George E. Balht.
J , entered summary judgment for the landlord, and
the supplier appealed. The Supreme Court, Hali. J .
held that no basis for recovery was shown
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contracting parties does not give rise to right of
restitution.
3. IMPLIED AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRACTS
<S^31
205H —
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation
205HI(C) Services Rendered
205Hk31
Materials furnished.
Formerly 412k3 WORK AND LABOR
Utah 1977.
Where tenant, who had agreed in lease to complete
such improvements in and upon leased property as its
basiness needs might require and to pay and discharge
all costs and expenses incident thereto to the end that
no hens would be placed on leased property,
contracted with supplier for certain materials, which
were incorporated into leased premises, and then
defaulted under lease, landlord was not liable to
supplier tor value of such incorporated materials on
theory ot unjust enrichment.
Jack Fairclough, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
appellant.

Affirmed
Maughan, J , dissented and filed opinion m whicn
Crockett, J., concurred.

V. Pershing Nelson, Provo, tor defendants and
respondents.
HALL, Justice:

1. MECHANICS1 LIENS <£=>63
257 -—
257H Right to Lien
25711(C) Agreement or Consent ot Owner
257k60
Necessity for Contract or Coasent by
Owner
257k63
Improvements by lessee.
Utah 1977
As general rule, tenant's creditors ha\e no greater
right to charge land with value of improvements or
repairs than tenant would have.
2. CONTRACTS <@=* 188
95
—
9511 Construction and Operation
9511(B) Parties
95kl88
Duties and liabilities of third persons.
Utah 1977.
Mere fact that third person benefits from contract
between two others does not make such third person
liable m quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or
restitution; there must be some misleading act,
request for services, or the like, to support such
action, and mere failure of performance by one ot the

This is an appeal from a summary judgment of no
cause ot action rendered by the district court
Defendant, Eldon Adams, is the owner of real
property located at 1140 South State Street, Orem,
Utah. He entered into a written lease with Great
Outdoors, Inc. under the terms of which the lessee
agreed to complete such improvements in and upon
said property as its business needs might require and
to pay and discharge all costs and expenses incident
thereto to the end that no hens would be placed on the
leased property. Great Outdoors, Inc. thereafter
contracted with plaintiff for the purchase of materials
which were ultimately furnished and incorporated into
the building on the leased premises. The appellant
was not privy to that agreement. Great Outdoors
subsequently defaulted in the performance of the
covenants of said lease and by court judgment the
lease was terminated and the property restored to
defendant. Plaintiff filed no hen against the lessee's
interest in the property and the tame limited for filing
has expired.
Plaintiff has never instituted suit against the lessee
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and brought this action directly against the defendant
on a theory of unjust enrichment.
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Judgment affirmed. Costs to defendant.
ELLETT, C.J., and WILK3NS, J., concur.

The foregoing recitation of facts are those stipulated
to by the parties at the time they presented their
respective motions for summary judgment to the trial
court.
*774 [1] This appeal may be disposed of by the
application of some very elementary principles of law.
As a general rule, a tenant's creditors have no greater
right to charge the land with the value of
improvements or repairs than the tenant would have
(FN1) and here the tenant had no such right having
contracted it away.
The right of plaintiff to recover for the goods
incorporated into defendant's real property must be
based upon an agreement, either express or implied,
and the stipulated facts are clear that none existed.
Plaintiff placed no reliance at all on the credit of
defendant and the lease agreement specifically
imposed upon the lessee the sole obligation of
payment. A case in point is Howard v. Societa Di
Unione E Beneficenza Italiana, et al.. 62 Cal.App.2d
842, 145 P.2d 694.
[2] The mere fact that a third person benefits from a
contract between two others does not make such third
person liable in quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or
restitution. See 66 AmJur.2d 960. There must be
some misleading act, request for services, or the like,
to support such an action.
Mere failure of
performance by one of the contracting parties does not
give rise to a right of restitution.
It is also noted that there was an express contract
between plaintiff and the lessee for the furnishing of
materials, and when an express agreement exists one
may not be implied. (FN2)
[3] The action brought by plaintiff is one in equity
and brought without any attempt to exhaust any legal
remedies available. Also, the stipulated facts are that
plaintiff has brought no suit against the lessee nor did
he initiate any action to enforce a mechanic's lien, if
any he had. As a consequence, such lien right was
lost by passage of time. Nor has plaintiff shown any
legal and sufficient excuse for his inaction against the
lessee.
The authorities cited by plaintiff are distinguishable
on the facts presented here and do not compel support
of its position.

MAUGHAN, Justice (dissenting):
Defendant is the owner of property located in Orem,
Utah. In March 1974, the defendant leased the
property to Great Outdoors, Inc. (hereinafter, lessee).
Under the terms of the lease, Great Outdoors agreed
to make improvements in the property and to operate
a health spa business thereon.
Lessee contracted with the plaintiff to install certain
fixtures. Plaintiff performed the contract at a cost of
53,149.87. Lessee did not pay the plaintiff, and
subsequently defaulted on the lease. Defendant lessor
brought a successful action to regain possession of the
property. After taking possession, the defendant
continued to operate a health spa business on the
premises under the name New Life Health Spa.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover costs for
materials and labor furnished.
On simultaneous
motions for summary judgment, the lower court held
for the defendant finding the plaintiff failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. This Court
should reverse.
The theory of plaintiff's case is that the defendant
has been unjustly enriched at plaintiff's expense and
should, therefore, make restitution to the plaintiff.
The lower court found the plaintiff was precluded
from maintaining this action, because there was no
privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant.
This finding mistakes the nature of a claim based on
unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment is premised on
a theory of quasi-contract, or a contract implied in
law.
A contract implied in law is not a contract at all, but
an obligation imposed by *775 law for the purpose
of bringing about justice and equity without
reference to the intent or the agreement of the
parties and, in some cases, in spite of an agreement
between the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is a non-<»ntractual obligation that is to be treated
procedurally as if it were a contract . . . . (Emphasis
in original.) (FN1)
The plaintiffs cause of action does not fail for lack
of privity.
Defendant referred to several cases he claims
support the lower court's judgment. These cases are
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distinguishable and do not support defendant's
assertioas.
For example, defendant claims, as a
genera] rule, a tenant's creditors have no greater right
to charge the value of the landlord's land with (the
costs of improvements) than the tenant could have. In
support of this position defendant relies on, among
others, American Bonding Co. v. Pueblo Investment
Co., 10 Cir., 150 F. 17 (1906) and Grizzle v.
Runbeck, 74 Riz. 92, 244 P.2d 1160 (1952).
American Bonding involved a suit by a tenant's
creditor against the tenant's surety. The case turned
on whether the tenant had agreed, by the terms of the
lease, to pay for improvements and whether the surety
had, by incorporating the lease into the bonding
agreement, agreed to pay for the improvements upon
tenant's default. In the context of interpreting the
terms of the lease, the court stated a lessee may not
make repairs at the expense of the lessor unless there
is an express agreement between them to do so. 150
F. at 28. There is no question m this case that the
tenant agreed to pay for the material and labor
furnished, both parties agree that he did.
The
question here is whether, as between plaintift and
defendant, defendant has been unjustly enriched, not
whether the tenant defaulted on his obligation The
Grizzle case is also distinguishable
In that case,
tenants brought suit against the landlord tor the costs
ot repairs The case turned on whether the landlord
was under a duty to repair and the court held that
without an agreement to the contran the landlord was
under no such duty. The question ot the landlord's
duty to the tenant is not involved here
Deiendant also relies on Howard v. Societa Di
Uruone E Beneficenza Italiana, 62 Cal App.2d 842,
145 P.2d 694 (1944). In that case the lessor (Society)
entered into an agreement with lessee tor the rental ot
a baseball field. The lessee agreed to be responsible
tor the costs of repairs and improvements and then
failed to pay for plaintiff's services. Plaintiff brought
suit against the lessor claiming that lessor and lessee
were joint venturers and theretore, the lessor was
liable on lessee's debt based on a partnership theory.
The court found no evidence of partnership or joint
venture. The language quoted by defendant from that
case is not only dicta, it was made in the context ot
determining the question of the existence of a
partnership, and related to a finding of an implied in
fact contract, not unjust enrichment.
Addressing himself directly to plaintiffs unjust
enrichment claim, defendant argues that plaintitfs
claim is barred because the enrichment ot detendant
was not unjust. Defendant cites a number ot cases in
support ot this proposition, mcldding Buell \ Orion
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State Bank, 327 Mich. 43, 41 N.W.2d 472 (1950);
Utschig v. McClone, 16 Wis.2d 506, 114 N.W 2d
854 (1962). The Buell case involved a transfer of
stock that at the time of the transfer was ot
questionable value. The stock later became worth a
great deal of money. Plaintiff brought suit claiming
that when her husband transferred the stock he was
not competent and that defendant had been unjustly
enriched by the transfer. The court held the decedent
was competent to make the transfer and although the
detendant was enriched, he had taken considerable
risk in accepting the *776 stock and his enrichment
was not unjust. The services of plaintiff, here, were
not of questionable value and defendant took no risk
m accepting them. The Utschig case involved a suit
by a subcontractor against a homeowner for the value
of labor and materials furnished. The court held that
a subcontractor could not maintain an action against
the homeowner unless there was an express agreement
between the two that the homeowner would be
responsible for the debts of the principal contractor.
The court stated that the homeowner was not liable on
an implied contract simply because he had received
services or goods. The court was not clear whether :t
was talking about an implied in fact contract or one
implied in law. However, the case would not seem
apphcaDle here. The rules preventing a subcontractor
from seeking payment directly from homeowners are
based on the assumption that the homeowner has
already paid the principal contractor and cannot De
held liable twice on the same debt. That is not the
case here
The other cases cited by defendant are
similarly unpersuasive.
The quesuon, then, remains has the detendant beer,
enriched and is enrichment unjust. As was stated in
Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, 33"?
(1947).
Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has
and retains money or benefits which in justice and
equity belong to another. . . . The benefit may be
an interest m money, land, chattels, or choses m
action; beneficial services conferred; satisfaction ot
a debt or duty owed by him; or anything which adds
to his security or advantage.
On the facts ot the Baugh case, the court held
against the plaintiff. The case is, however, clearly
distinguishable from the facts at hand and the general
definition given of unjust enrichment is applicable to
the case at bar. See also, Fleming v. Wineberg, 253
Or 472, 455 P.2d 600 (1969). It would seem clear
:he defendant has been enriched. Improvements were
made to his property that made it possible tor him to
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ran a health spa business on the premises. In the
lease the defendant required that these improvements
be made. Presumably, the defendant would not have
required these improvements if he did not expect to
benefit from them.
Defendant did in fact regain possession of the
property and is running a business with the aid of
improvements that, without the lease, he would have
had to pay for himself. In other words, defendant has
obtained the benefit of plaintiff's services without
having to pay for them. The case of Paschall's, Inc.
v. Dozier, supra, is directly in point. In that case the
daughter of the defendant contracted with the plamtitt
to remodel a bathroom m defendant's house. The
daughter was living with the defendant at the time.
Plaintiff performed the services, but the daughter was
unable to pay.
Plaintiff sued the defendant
homeowner on a theory of unjust enrichment. The
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to restitution.
The court stated:
The defendant asserts that an implied undertaking
cannot arise against one benefited by the work
performed, where the work is done under a special
contract with another. While tms may be the
general rule, we do not think that it is applicable in
every case. Indisputably, where one is afforded
recovery from the person with whom he has a
contract, he cannot also recover from third persons
incidentally benefited by his performance. . . .
However, the situation is dissimilar where a person
furnishes material and labor under a contract for the
benefit of a third party and that contract becomes
unenforceable or invalid. In that situation there is
certainly no reason to preclude the furnisher . . .
from seeking recovery against the third person on
the theory of (unjust enrichment). 407 S.W.2d at
154-155. (FN2)
W^hile it is true, as defendant notes, that in these
cases the defaulting party and the *777. defendant
had some special relationship (father/daughter,
mother/son, etc.) the basic reasoning of the cases
applies to the facts at hand. In the case at bar,
plaintiff entered into a contract with a defaulting
party. That contract was at least m part for the
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benefit of a third party-the defendant. The contract
has become unenforceable, the defendant is enjoying
the benefits of the contract without paying for them.
The question to be answered m an unjust enrichment
is, do justice and equity require that the defendant be
forced to make restitution. Under the facts of this
case, they do so require.
The plaintiff is not precluded by the Uniform
Commercial Code from pursuing the remedy of
restitution. Section 70A--1-103, U.C.A., provides
that the principles of law and equity supplement the
Code and are not usurped by it.
From the foregoing it can be seen that summary
judgment was not proper. This being an action m
equity, a wider exploration of the facts is called for. I
would reverse and remand for an evidentiary
determination of the central question, 'Why should
plaintitf not recover.'
CROCKETT, J., concurs m Justice MAUGHAN'S
dissent.
FN1
49 Am.Jur.2d 702, Section 765, citing
authorities.
FN2. 66 Am.Jur.2d 948, Section 6, citing Verdi v.
Helper State Bank, 57 Utah 502, 196 P. 225, 15
A.L.R. 641.
FN1. Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler,
95 Idaho 739, 518 P.2c 1201, 1205 (1974). As
stated in Paschall's, Inc. v. Dozier, 219 Term. 45,
407 S W.2d 150, 154 (1966): 'It is well established
that want of privity between parties is no obstacle to
recovery under quasi-contract.' See also: Fowler v.
Taylor, Utah, 554 P.2d 205 (1976); Rapp v. Salt
Lake City, Utah, 527 P.2d 651 (1974); Trollope v.
Koerner, 106 Ariz. 210, 470 P.2d 91 (1970).
FN2.
See also, De Gaspen v. Valicent, 198
Pa.Super. 455, 181 A.2d 862 (1962); Karon v.
Kellogg, 195 Minn. 134, 261 N.W. 861 (1935);
Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 266 N.C. 467, 146
S E.2d 434 (1966).
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